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ABSTRACT 
 
     The status of resources and training system (SORTS) is a process that measures the 
“health” of units and wings in day-to-day preparedness and the ability to execute a major 
theater war or other scenario envisioned in the national security strategy.  With talk of the 
current reporting system not accurately reflecting units’ readiness, it is time to evaluate 
the system to identify key problems and re-design the process to better reflect units’ 
capabilities.  The objective of this thesis was to inform Air Force leadership of the current 
state of the SORTS system to ensure it was adequate.  By surveying current MAJCOM, 
Wing, Group, and Squadron users on their interpretations of how the system works, this 
thesis will determine if there are common problems that key users have encountered. 
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Analysis of the Current AF-Specific Status of Resources and Training System 
(SORTS) Reporting System 
 
 
 
I. Introduction 
 
 
Overview 
     This chapter discusses the background and rationale for this study.  This thesis 
examined how the current status of resources and training system (SORTS) reporting 
system works and some concerns about the system.  More importantly, this study 
gathered feedback from members using this system in the field to determine whether or 
not SORTS is effective.  This chapter is divided into six areas:  problem statement, 
research questions, investigative questions, data sources and analysis, scope and 
limitations, and a summary. 
 
Problem Statement 
         SORTS is a process that measures the “health” of units and wings in day-to-day 
preparedness and the ability to execute a major theater war or other scenario envisioned 
in the national security strategy.  With talk of the current reporting system not accurately 
reflecting units’ readiness, it is time to evaluate the system to identify key problems and 
re-design the process, if necessary, to better reflect units’ capabilities.  Air Force 
leadership needed to know if the current process for measuring units’ readiness levels 
was adequate.  By surveying current Major Command (MAJCOM), Wing, Group, and 
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Squadron users on their interpretations of how the system works, this thesis will find out 
if there were common problems all the key stakeholders encountered. 
Research Questions 
     The objective of this research was to determine if personnel using SORTS felt the 
system was adequate and effective in measuring the health of units to perform their 
missions.  This thesis focused on getting feedback from personnel who work with the 
system.  In order to determine how effective it was, the following questions needed to be 
answered:  1) How well did the current SORTS system measure units’ readiness; and 2) 
What were the main issues with the system and how did they affect the desired outcome?  
This enabled further documentation of the system because it gave personnel a chance to 
provide feedback and/or make suggestions to improve the system. 
Investigative Questions 
     The objective of this research was to analyze the current SORTS reporting system, 
and make recommendations and suggestions based on inputs from members who use the 
system in the field.  The thesis should answer the following questions: 
1. What are the objectives of the current SORTS reporting system?    
 
2. Does the current reporting process meet these objectives?   
 
3. Who are the key players in the SORTS reporting system? 
 
a. Who provides the information? 
b. Who uses the information? 
 
Furthermore, this study sought to determine if differences between respondents existed, 
and if they did, was this based on varying degrees of importance with each issue, or if the 
different organizational levels, MAJCOM, or ranks were influential factors. 
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Data Sources and Analysis 
     The first investigative question was answered by researching AFI 10-201, “Status of 
Resources and Training System”, to establish the objectives of the current SORTS 
system.  This Air Force instruction governed the SORTS program and established the 
purpose and goals of the system.   
     The second and third investigative questions were answered through conversations 
with OPRs at the Headquarters Air Force (HAF), Wing, and Squadron levels as well as 
questionnaires distributed to MAJCOM, Wing, Group, and Squadron leaders to find out 
how they used the system and if they have had any problems.  This data will be analyzed 
to see if there are common problems and identify key differences with the various levels 
of involvement.   
     This study involved a situation where little historical records or data was available, so 
content analysis was the design chosen for this qualitative study.  Content analysis is a 
detailed, systematic assessment of the contents of a particular body of material in order to 
identify patterns, themes, or biases (Leedy, 2001:155).  Therefore, the data relied heavily 
on the efficient use of intuition and judgment of a group of persons who were keen 
observers and had extensive experience and knowledge in the subject area.  This was why 
the Delphi technique was used.  
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 This technique was designed to elicit opinions from a group with the aim of generating a 
group response.   
“Delphi replaces direct confrontation and debate by carefully planned, 
anonymous, and orderly program of sequential individual interrogations 
usually conducted by questionnaires.  The series of questionnaires is 
interspersed with feedback derived from the respondents.  Delphi may be 
characterized as a method for structuring a group communication process 
so that the process is effective in allowing a group of individuals, as a 
whole, to deal with a complex problem” (Wellman, 2003:30).   
 
Members of a group were questioned anonymously via email questionnaires.  Subjects 
were asked to list and explain issues, and after each set of questions, a summary of the 
group response was obtained.  The responses were grouped with similar responses and to 
determine if there is a pattern of issues with the system.   
“Delphi collects and organizes judgments in a systematic fashion.  This 
technique gains input, established priorities, and builds consensus.  Delphi 
organizes and helps focus dissent, turning this group effect into a window 
of opportunity, while protecting the subjects’ identities, consolidating 
group responses by eliminating extraneous material, and assuring each 
respondent’s input is included in the final responses and reduces the 
pressures of group conformity by revealing range of responses submitted” 
(Wellman, 2003:31-32).   
 
     The last question was addressed by comparing the most prevalent problems with the 
governing AFI to see if these issues were addressed, there were misinterpretations of the 
objectives, or the objectives needed to be revised.  This data was used to make 
recommendations for the current AFIs and manuals or future upgrades to the system. 
Scope and Limitations 
     As stated previously, the Air Force is not the only branch of the Armed Forces that 
uses SORTS for official readiness reporting.  Over 10,000 units in the DoD report 
readiness using SORTS (GAO/NSIAD-96-111BR, 1996:4).  Due to the nature and scope 
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of this thesis, a comprehensive analysis of issues for each branch and its organizations 
could not be accomplished in the timeframe of this study.  Therefore, this study was 
designed to analyze the current AF-specific SORTS system, particularly Air Combat 
Command (ACC) and Air Mobility Command (AMC) MAJCOMs.  Both of these 
MAJCOMS contain bases with operational missions.  Also, each MAJCOM has one 
location where a mixture of personnel, whom could be potential survey respondents, was 
co-located from the MAJCOM, Wing, Group, and Squadron levels.   
     There were various limitations that could affect the analysis of SORTS.  Some 
limitations that could not be controlled could include: 
1. In some circumstances, members may be motivated to report what they think their 
leadership wants to hear when it does not accurately reflect their current perceived 
concerns.  Sometimes people do not answer honestly because they do not like to go 
against the majority or for fear of retribution.  As a result, the inputs they provide are 
not the most accurate.  Also, interview questions may impose a format bias 
unintentionally.  The questions used in this study may have been interpreted 
differently by each respondent, which could have affected the data used in this study. 
 
2. SORTS is a classified report, which may make information not readily accessible.  In 
addition, respondents may not be able to openly discuss concerns if it is considered a 
classified topic.  This factor limits the information respondents can provide on the 
survey.  
 
3. Delphi is not a universal remedy and another form of communication may actually be 
better for this study.  We decided to use the Delphi technique, but there were other 
qualitative methods that could have been used.  For example, a case study or 
grounded theory study could have been used because both focus on understanding a 
situation in its natural setting.   
 
4. Researchers may over specify the area they are studying and not allow for other views 
of the problem.  The questions provided to the respondents may have been too 
narrowly focused and did not allow the respondent to expound on all the issues they 
had with the system that the researchers were not looking for. 
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5. Generation of an artificial group consensus by ignoring disagreements is another way 
data could be skewed.  This also relates to the way researches group data.  The way 
data is combined with similar responses could have easily varied with another set of 
researchers.  Therefore, this is a judgment call by the researchers and accounted for in 
their results and analysis. 
 
6. Underestimation of the demand placed upon respondents by the technique could have 
affected the data.  For example, respondents may have been busy with work or 
pressed for time and were not able to put as much time in filling out the survey as 
some other respondents.  Personal and professional obligations may limit the amount 
of time each subject can dedicate to responses. 
 
7. Responses may not always be independent.  Although respondents were given 
questionnaire individually, there may have been some collaboration with the 
responses if individuals discussed the questions with other individuals.   
 
8. There were different levels of expertise within the subjects in the SORTS field.  The 
respondents varied in years of service, years working with SORTS, AFSCs, and 
educations levels.  These factors could have affected how well the respondents 
worked with SORTS. 
 
9. The future may bring about drastic changes in which the results from this thesis may 
not apply.  Therefore, the results do not apply to every organization in the Air Force 
(Belka, 2001:48-51). 
 
Summary 
 
     This chapter discussed pertinent information that set the framework for this thesis, 
which is to determine if the current system for measuring unit readiness was adequate.  
Since there was no past documentation evaluating the SORTS reporting system, data will 
be gathered from personnel who have used the system in the field to determine if any 
concerns exist.  The next chapter focuses on important background information 
concerning past readiness problems.  More specifically, Chapter II will review existing 
literature concerning issues with military readiness. 
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II. Literature Review 
Overview 
     Questions have been raised that the current readiness reporting system, SORTS, does 
not accurately reflect units’ readiness (Orlansky et al, 1997:II-3).  Therefore, Air Force 
leadership needed to know if the current process for measuring units’ readiness was 
adequate.  The goals of this thesis were to give some background information on SORTS, 
present the purpose of SORTS, show what was required in the SORTS report, address 
concerns with the current system, and justify why this analysis needed to occur. 
Background 
     SORTS is an internal tool for use by the Chairman Joint Chiefs of Staff (CJCS), 
Services, Unified Commands, and Combat Support Agencies.  It is the single automated 
reporting system within the DoD that functions as the central registry of all operational 
units of the U.S. Armed Forces and certain foreign organizations.  There are three main 
purposes for this system:  1) provide critical data to crisis planning; 2) provide data for 
the deliberate planning process; and 3) to be used by the CSAF and subordinate 
commanders in assessing their effectiveness in meeting their Title 10, United States Code 
responsibility (AFI 10-201, 2003:8). SORTS is designed to support crisis response 
planning; deliberate or peacetime planning and provide the Chairman with Service-
unique information regarding a measured unit.  The Service Chiefs’ management 
responsibility is to organize, train, and equip forces for use by the combatant commands 
as well as participate in the joint planning and execution process (GAO/NSIAD-96-194, 
1996:2-3). 
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     As a resource and unit monitoring system, SORTS indicates the level of selected 
resources and training status required to undertake the full mission set for which a unit is 
organized or designed to do.  The Air Force uses status information in SORTS in 
assessing readiness and the impact of budgetary allocations and management actions on 
unit level readiness.  SORTS provides broad bands of information on selected unit status 
indicators which includes the commander’s assessment of the unit’s “health” or ability to 
execute its mission.  Measurement criteria are designed and developed by functional 
managers to provide valid assessments regarding unit readiness, and Commanders assess 
measurements against their mission set to determine whether or not they provided a 
realistic indication of the unit’s readiness (AFI 10-201, 2003:1). 
     Readiness is, as the Deputy Under Secretary of Defense for Readiness described it,  
“the general ability of forces to arrive where they are needed, on time and 
prepared to effectively carry out assigned mission objectives for which 
they were designed.  The ability of units to be ready on time to carry out 
their missions, in turn, is a function of having the equipment, supplies, 
logistics and experienced people with the skills to accomplish assigned 
tasks” (Orlansky et al, 1997:S-1).   
 
The DoD assesses military readiness at three levels—(1) the individual unit level; 
(2) the joint forces level; and (3) the aggregate, or strategic, level.  “Unit readiness” refers 
to the ability of units, such as Army division, Navy ships, and Air Force wings, to 
provide capabilities required of the combatant commands and are derived from the ability 
of each unit to accomplish its mission.  “Joint readiness” is the combatant commands’ 
ability to integrate and synchronize units from one or more services to execute a mission.  
“Strategic readiness” is a mixture of unit and joint readiness with great emphasis on the 
ability of the armed forces as a whole, including the services, the combatant commands, 
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and the combat support agencies, to fight and meet the demands of the national security 
strategy (GAO/T-NSIAD-96-111BR, 1996:1). 
     Until the early 1990s, the DoD defined “readiness” narrowly in terms of the ability of 
units to accomplish the missions for which they were designed, and SORTS was the only 
nonservice-specific system DoD had to measure readiness.  It had been used extensively 
by the services to formulate a big-picture view of readiness.  As a result, limitations to 
SORTS surfaced and were well documented for many years by various audit and 
oversight organizations (GAO/T-NSIAD-98-124, 1998:3). 
Purpose 
     SORTS is the DoD’s automated reporting system that identifies the current level of 
selected resources and training status of a unit or in other words its ability to carry out its 
wartime mission.  Units report their overall readiness status as well as the status of four 
resource areas:  personnel, equipment and supplies on hand, equipment condition, and 
training.  Overall readiness status is generally reported at a level consistent with the 
lowest rated resource level, but commanders are allowed to subjectively upgrade or 
downgrade the overall rating.  As stated previously, SORTS is an internal management 
tool used by the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs, services, and combatant commanders.  It 
provides the Chairman with the necessary unit information to achieve an adequate and 
feasible military response to crisis situations and participate in the joint planning and 
execution process (GAO/T-NSIAD-96-111BR, 1996:1). 
     The DoD has over 10,000 units that reported readiness status under SORTS (GAO/T-
NSIAD-96-111BR, 1996:4).  SORTS remains the basic building block for readiness 
assessment.  Any discussion of readiness measurement has to start with SORTS because 
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it is the foundation of DoD’s unit readiness assessment process—the primary source of 
information used for reviews at the joint and strategic levels.  Even though the system is 
widely and heavily used, inherent limitations such as the inability to signal impending 
changes in readiness and imprecise ratings for unit resources and training may be 
reflected in reviews at the joint and strategic levels (GAO/T-NSIAD-98-124, 1998:2).     
     The system’s database indicates, at a selected point in time, the extent to which these 
units possess the required resources and training to undertake their wartime missions.  
SORTS is intended to enable the Joint Staff, the combatant commands, and the military 
services to, among other things, prepare lists of readily available units, assist in 
identifying or confirming major constraints on the employment of units, and confirm 
shortfalls and distribution problems with unit resources (GAO/T-NSIAD-98-124, 1998:2-
3). 
Requirements 
     Readiness status of a unit is reported by assigning “C” levels, which are the degree to 
which unit resources meet prescribed levels of personnel, equipment, and training.   
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They measure combat readiness and any associated resource constraints and are defined 
as follows:   
• C-1—Unit can undertake the full wartime mission for which it is organized or 
designed.   
 
• C-2—Unit can undertake the bulk of its wartime mission.   
 
• C-3—Unit can undertake major portions of its wartime mission.  
 
• C-4—Unit requires additional resources and/or training to undertake its 
wartime mission, but if the situation dictates, it may be required to undertake 
portions of the mission with resources on hand.   
 
• C-5—Unit is undergoing a service-directed resource change and is not 
prepared to undertake its wartime mission (GAO/T-NSIAD-96-111BR, 
1996:1) 
 
If a unit is not fully ready (C-2 or lower), the reason for that condition must be reported 
(Orlansky et al, 1997:II-2). 
     A readiness reporting system should be designed to address three goals:  1) respond to 
congressional readiness concerns; 2) provide adequate readiness information to assist the 
Secretary of Defense, CJCS, CINCs, agencies, and services in performing peacetime and 
warfighting missions; and 3) revise reporting in the context of efforts to transform the 
defense establishment to meet future challenges.  Modernized reporting should be based 
upon a systems or process approach that represents an organization or group of 
organizations with a common goal.   
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Readiness is a measure of the ability of systems to achieve goals and should have actual 
output compared with required output (Tillson, 2000:2). 
“The basic steps in a systems approach to readiness reporting are (1) 
identifying the systems whose readiness will be reported, (2) determining 
the output required of the system, (3) identifying the parts of each system 
and collecting the added data needed to determine their readiness in terms 
of output, and (4) requiring the responsible CINC, agency, or service to 
report on the readiness of their system.”  (Tillson, 2000:2) 
 
This method provides an overall assessment for the entire force from individual units to 
the National Command Authority (Tillson, 2000:2).  A systems approach gives 
participants in the system an opportunity they lacked today—to see where they fit and 
how their actions affected the whole system.   
     A systems approach offers a better measure for judging modernization and 
transformation by integrating future operational requirements in a systemic assessment 
program.  Understanding readiness to execute a task requires understanding the readiness 
of a system designed to execute that task.  A systems approach to readiness reporting also 
offers a coherent and comprehensive basis for discussing both operational capabilities 
and resource allocation.  Such a method could increase the capacity to meet near-term 
requirements and reward the process of transformation (Tillson, 2000:4).  Knowing the 
readiness of large, complex systems is based on an appreciation of the readiness entities 
that made up the systems.  They include operational units as well as supporting entities—
depots, ports, pre-positioned equipment, communication nodes, hospitals, training 
centers, and inventory control points—that were critical for readiness.  Each report its 
readiness to conduct mission-essential tasks associated with its role in the system whose 
readiness is being reported (Tillson, 2000:3). 
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     In this approach, the goal has to be measurable, comparing the actual capability with 
objective goals.  Lacking a measure of how deficiencies contributed to the readiness 
system, the effort to eliminate a defect tends to lead to micromanagement or sub-
optimization.  They simply lack a comprehensive view of how the problem under 
investigation contributed to readiness.  This may have occurred because resources 
intended to fix a problem may not have promoted improvement because both reporting 
organizations and the Pentagon were stovepiped.  In essence, the goal needs to be 
measured in terms of the influence on the throughput of the system, which leads to a 
search for the weak link that created a bottleneck or constraint in the system (Tillson, 
2000:3). 
Concerns 
     The following section is a summary of reported SORTS issues from a GAO analysis.  
This includes problems the Air Force, Navy and Army encountered, Guard and Reserve 
issues, weaknesses in readiness reporting during the Gulf War crisis, and DoD actions 
taken to resolve these issues. 
     SORTS is the principal report available to the Office of the Secretary of Defense and 
The Joint Staff on the training readiness of the four services.  “SORTS has been judged—
not always fairly—by the GAO and the Congressional Budgeting Office as being based 
on inaccurate data and subjective assessments” (Orlansky et al, 1997:IV-1).   
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For example, prior reviews by the GAO and other agencies found: 
• SORTS represents a snapshot in time and does not signal impending changes in 
readiness. 
 
• SORTS relies on military judgment for certain ratings, including the 
commanders’ overall rating of unit readiness.  In some cases, SORTS ratings 
reflect a higher or lower rating than the reported analytical measures supported.  
However, DoD officials viewed subjectivity in SORTS reports as a strength 
because the commanders’ judgments provided professional military assessments 
of unit readiness.  The officials also noted that much of the information in the 
SORTS reports was objective and quantitative. 
 
• The broad measurements that comprise SORTS ratings for resource availability 
could mislead managers because they are imprecise and therefore could mask 
underlying problems.  For example, SORTS allows units to report the same 
capability rating for personnel strength even though their personnel strength may 
have differed by 10 percent. 
 
• SORTS data is maintained in multiple databases located at combatant commands, 
major commands, and service headquarters and is not synchronized across the 
databases. 
 
• SORTS data is possibly out-of-date or nonexistent for some units registered in the 
database because reporting requirements are not enforced. 
 
• Army SORTS procedures that require review of unit reports through the chain of 
command significantly delay the submission of SORTS data to the Joint Staff 
(GAO/T-NSIAD-98-124, 1998:3). 
 
Other assessments showed another list of criticisms to the report.  Although there was 
some overlap, new finding were also documented below (Orlansky et al, 1997:II-3): 
1. The system, although mandated by CJCS, reflects unit (i.e., Service) rather than 
Joint readiness.  Joint combat capability, observable in Joint exercises, are not 
reported in SORTS 
 
2. SORTS reports generic readiness, rather than CINC mission-specific readiness.  
Its structure and format do not use the recently adopted standard of Joint Military 
Essential Task List (JMETLs), used now by all regional CINCS for training in 
their assigned mission. 
 
3. SORTS describes current readiness; it does not include estimates of future 
readiness over periods of, e.g., 6 months, 12 months, etc. 
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4. SORTS does not distinguish between conducting required training programs (i.e., 
process or training accomplishment) and demonstrated combat capacity (i.e., 
output or performance effectiveness).  The results of joint exercises are reported 
in the Joint Universal Lessons Learned System (JULLS) but not in SORTS.  
These results are narrative reports not designed for inclusion in a numerical data 
base. 
 
5. Significant item in SORTS, such as overall combat capability (i.e., the C-level 
ratings) could be based on commanders’ subjective assessments, rather than on 
objective, demonstrated performance capability.  Greater use of objective 
measures are now feasible and generally available in data compiled on 
instrumented ranges and in command post exercises that used combat models. 
 
6. SORTS did not include the following information regarded as central to current 
and future readiness: 
 
• Mobility (Mobility is a Navy Primary Mission Area reflected in SORTS) 
• Morale 
• Leadership 
• Command, control, communications and intelligence 
• Exercises 
• Funding for training and OPTEMPO (Orlansky et al, 1997:II-3) 
 
     Questions about the validity and thoroughness of the military readiness reporting have 
been raised for some time now and are periodically reported on limitations to official unit 
readiness reports.  Congress expressed concern regarding apparent inconsistencies 
between official readiness reports and the actual readiness of units in the field.  Some 
concern was also raised pertaining to the DoD’s lack of progress in integrating additional 
readiness indicators into official readiness reports because the approved legislation 
required DoD to include the indicators in its reports too (GAO/T-NSIAD-98-124, 
1998:1).  
     Perhaps the most critical problem is that the current system does not measure the 
capability of the Armed Forces to accomplish the missions established in the national 
security strategy.  Instead it focuses on one or two major theater wars and a limited set of 
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tasks associated with those missions, forcing CINCs, agencies, and services to focus their 
reporting on narrow functional areas that do not address the full range of operational 
tasks (Tillson, 2000:1).  Other criticisms included essential elements are not being 
reported, the overall system lacks comprehensiveness, and its inability to indicate 
readiness to execute strategies.  Also, SORTS is said to capture data only on a major 
weapon system and other critical equipment in which a study found value in monitoring 
the availability of equipment not reported through SORTS (GAO/T-NSIAD-98-124, 
1998:8).  The study also said the report lacked specific details on deficiencies and 
planned remedial actions needed for congressional oversight.  This presented a vague 
picture of DoD’s readiness problems.  One report said Army personnel readiness was a 
problem, but failed to provide data on the numbers of personnel or units involved.  In 
addition, the report did not discuss how the deficiency affected the overall readiness of 
units involved.  Furthermore, remedial actions were given in general terms with few 
specific details and provided little insight into how DoD plans to correct the problems 
(GAO/T-NSIAD-98-124, 1998:6). 
     GAO Analysis       
     Past literature also stated that SORTS does not capture all of the factors that the DoD 
considers critical to a comprehensive readiness analysis and indicators of personnel 
readiness, such as operating tempo and personnel morale (GAO, 1996:2,11).   
     The Department has a process in place that identified and corrected readiness 
problems when they emerged, and this demonstrates the DoD’s continuous vigilance and 
commitment to readiness as its first priority (GAO/T-NSIAD-96-111BR, 1996:16).  
DoD-wide, the percentage of military units with the ability to undertake all or major 
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portions of assigned missions remained generally stable from January 1, 1990, to March 
31, 1995.  Readiness reductions were caused primarily by personnel shortages, equipment 
shortages, and difficulty in obtaining training for personnel in certain military 
occupations (GAO/T-NSIAD-96-111BR, 1996:2). 
     A GAO report analyzed military readiness data contained in the DoD’s SORTS to 
determine if the data showed significant changes in readiness since 1990—a year of peak 
readiness.  This report provided readiness information for the four military services.  
Specifically, it summarized the reported overall readiness status of all military units from 
January 1, 1990, to March 31, 1995 and assessed readiness trends of selected units from 
each service for the same period.  When applicable, it discussed reported readiness 
problems experienced throughout a service and by the selected units and explained 
significant changes in the reported readiness of the selected units (GAO/T-NSIAD-96-
111BR, 1996:1).  For the selected units, data elements and identified trends were graphed 
and the readiness was compared with operational scheduling and maintenance data.  
Then, these conditions were discussed with readiness officers from the respective 
services (GAO/T-NSIAD-96-111BR, 1996:4).  There were significant differences in the 
way each service manages readiness and reported readiness fluctuated with deployment 
and maintenance cycles.  There were also significant changes or fluctuations in the 
readiness of five active Army units due to contingency operations and the National Guard 
units overstated their readiness by understating the number of training days required to 
achieve a C-1 status (GAO/T-NSIAD-96-111BR, 1996:2,3).  Reduction or fluctuation in 
the readiness of airlift and Airborne Warning and Control System units occurred because 
aircraft were continuously committed to the operations in Saudi Arabia, Somalia, and 
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Bosnia.  The heavy usage of airlift aircraft with contingency and counterdrug operations 
strained the supply of spare parts and engines in conjunction (GAO/T-NSIAD-96-111BR, 
1996:3). 
     Navy Problems 
     The Navy has also documented problems with their readiness reporting.  Five of eight 
Navy aviation units showed a similar readiness trend.  In the remaining units, significant 
reductions in readiness levels were identified, and the training readiness of aviation 
squadrons Navy-wide declined significantly due to the shortage of flying hours funding 
and personnel shortages (GAO/T-NSIAD-96-111BR, 1996:9).  The percentage of 
Marines that reported C-1 or C-2 declined due to insufficient flying hours and normal 
variations due to detachments deploying from home, or parent, unit to support 
contingency operations.  This degraded the readiness status of a parent unit, which then 
began to build toward its next commitment.  The continuous cycle of deploying the best-
trained personnel and mission-ready equipment may have caused changes in the reported 
status of the unit or caused it to remain at a low level over time.  Although readiness for 
many of the units were stable, it was not at the desired level because highly skilled 
military occupational specialties were scarce because the Marine did not have their own 
facilities to train personnel for these skills (GAO/T-NSIAD-96-111BR, 1996:11). 
     Army Problems 
     The Army also reported problems in this study.  Contingency operations and 
equipment maintenance problems caused a general reduction in readiness reported by 
National Guard units.  In some cases, commanders’ subjective upgrades of overall 
readiness ratings were incorrect or assessments were not as accurate when the reporting 
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unit was deployed carrying out peacekeeping or security operations.  The National Guard 
had more stringent reporting requirements which caused them to understate the number 
of training days required to achieve C-1 status.  In retrospect, there was no way of 
determining whether the upgrades were justified because many commanders viewed the 
SORTS report as “report cards” on their performance and therefore made every effort to 
present the unit in the best light.  This was a standard, deliberate part of the process that 
provided a more complete assessment of a unit’s readiness (GAO/T-NSIAD-96-111BR, 
1996:13). 
     Guard and Reserve Problems 
     As for the Air Force, Guard and reserve units were the most stable, but they still 
encountered problems.  Viewing reserve components as an integral part of the total force, 
their aircraft were continuously used to support Desert Storm, Somalia, and Bosnia 
operations, along with counterdrug operations.  This affected the reported readiness of 
Air Force units during this period. In fact, some units were over utilized from 58% to 
175%, which caused greater demand for spare parts and engines and accelerated the rate 
at which the aircraft required major repairs.  Commanders have the prerogative to 
upgrade or downgrade their unit’s overall readiness status.  Air Force commanders 
however did sometimes upgrade their units’ overall readiness status.  Although the study 
did not consider upgrades to be a problem but a strength, there are critics who felt the 
subjective upgrades take away from the effectiveness of the system.  Others felt a 
commander was in the best position to accurately assess the readiness of a unit on the 
basis of a wide range of information available to make this judgment (GAO/T-NSIAD-
96-111BR, 1996:14-15). 
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     Gulf War Problems 
     The Gulf War crisis, August 1990 to February 1991, offered a limited opportunity to 
compare a unit’s readiness for combat, as reported in SORTS, with a Service’s 
willingness to commit that unit to combat.  Specifically, the Army indicated that three 
National Guard brigades required over 120 days of post-mobilization training even 
though their Commanders reported in SORTS that only the standard 40 days 
predeployment training would be needed to prepare their brigades for combat duty.  The 
Army’s assessment proved to be pessimistic because the three brigades were found to be 
ready in 90 days, 1 day before the war ended.  Since then, a number of reports have 
identified various limitations in the DoD readiness reporting system, with a primary focus 
on SORTS.  This approach overlooked that fact that over hundreds of units of all Services 
rated as ready in SORTS, only three were not deployed to the Persian Gulf.  This 
suggested it can still be considered a reliable system, but as noted, there were still some 
areas that needed improvement (Orlansky et al, 1997:II-2-3).  
     DoD Remedy 
     SORTS was criticized because it included various subjective, rather than objective 
assessments of training readiness and it focused on current not near-future estimates of 
training (Orlansky et al, 1997:S-1).  Commanders sometimes reported overall readiness 
levels higher than the measured resource areas.  Air Force officials said they considered 
this SORTS feature to be a strength of the system.  They believed that a commander was 
in the best position to accurately assess the readiness of a unit on the basis of a wide 
range of information available to make this judgment (GAO/T-NSIAD-96-111BR, 
1996:3).  These subjective assessments were qualitative, where it may not be readily 
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apparent where ratings are inflated.  This subjectivity does not necessarily mean that the 
judgment was inaccurate or unreliable but it may easily become so if little attention was 
given to how they were collected and scored (Orlansky et al,1997:III-22). 
          DoD took actions to improve the SORTS which included phased improvements to 
the readiness assessment system.  The first phase addressed the technical limitations of 
SORTS in hopes of developing a synchronized DoD-wide system linked across multiple 
databases.  The link with other databases in a common computer environment would 
make readiness information more readily assessable to decision makers.  Also, the 
upgrades would make the system a lot easier to use.  The services already developed or 
implemented software to automate the process of entering SORTS data at the unit level.  
Technical upgrades were aimed at improving the timeliness and accuracy, but the 
upgrades did not address the inability of the system to signal impending changes in 
readiness which contributed to the lack of precision in reporting unit resources and 
training.  DoD also took steps to introduce a joint component to readiness assessment 
which brought together a readiness assessment from a broad range of DoD organizations 
and elevates readiness concerns to senior military officials.  It incorporated wartime 
scenarios, added a joint perspective conducted on a recurring cycle, and included 
procedures for tracking and addressing reported deficiencies (GAO/T-NSIAD-98-124, 
1998:4). 
Summary 
     The chapter discussed background information on SORTS, presented the purpose of 
SORTS, showed what was required in the SORTS report, addressed concerns with the 
current system, and justified why the analysis of this system needed to occur.   
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     The war on terrorism and increased deployments are rooted in the changing national 
military strategy.  According to DoD officials, the increased focus on regional security 
and stability has been accompanied by increased deployments for peace operations 
(GAO, 1996:10).  The systems method helps resolve conflict between current and future 
readiness.  If the Secretary, Chairman, CINCs, and services were able to see the entire 
system, they would be capable of identifying elements that can be improved in the near 
term to enhance current readiness.  They would do this by identifying elements that could 
be improved in the longer term with a modernization or force structure program.  
Visibility of the tradeoffs possible with the systems approach possibly enables better 
choices about current readiness versus future readiness (Tillson, 2000:3). 
     There is a general agreement that readiness reporting is flawed and did not accurately 
reflect operational requirement in the post-Cold War era.  Readiness reporting has 
improved somewhat in recent years with incremental changes to SORTS, which 
increased the ease and precision of reporting by the services.  Also, institutionalizing 
readiness reporting and responsibilities resulted in enhanced appreciation of readiness 
issues in the program review process (Tillson, 2000:1).  Readiness reporting should 
eventually become virtually automatic where applications will be updated automatically 
with unit data.  Then, intelligent agents could sweep databases to find readiness problems 
and bottlenecks and even identify potential workarounds (Tillson, 2000:4). 
     Commanders were asked to document their perception of the current process and 
determined the degree to which they perceived the current reports were inflated or 
realistic.  “A fundamental premise of SORTS reporting is integrity.  Commanders must 
“tell it like it is” and not allow the masking of deficiencies affecting their ability to 
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provide capability or other readiness related information.  Risk must be balanced with 
responsibility.  Effective management of unit resources required accurate information at 
all levels” (AFI 10-201, 2003:8).  Therefore, it was time to evaluate the system in order 
to identify key problems and re-design the process to better reflect units’ capabilities, if 
necessary.   
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III. Methodology 
     This chapter describes the steps taken to answer the research and investigative 
questions listed in Chapter I, as well as the technique used to answer the questions in this 
study.  This information enables common concerns with the system to be recognized.  
Then, this data will be used to determined if the SORTS reporting system was effective.   
Method of Approach 
     The goal of this thesis is to analyze the current SORTS reporting system.  The war on 
terrorism and increased deployments are rooted in the changing national military strategy, 
which makes it necessary for military members to be trained and equipped to fight.  In 
order to evaluate the system, two key research questions needed to be answered:  1)  How 
well did the current SORTS system measure units’ readiness?  and 2)  What were the 
main issues with the system and how did they affect the desired outcome?  This subject 
has not been systematically explored or documented, so data must be collected from 
members in the field using the system (Croslen, 1989:62).  Since no historical records or 
data are available, data relied heavily on the efficient use of intuition and judgment of a 
group of persons who were keen observers and had extensive experience and knowledge 
in the subject area.  The following investigative questions were used to construct a survey 
in order to gather data for this study: 
1. What are the key problems with the current SORTS reporting system? 
a. What is the information used for? 
b. How is the current information insufficient?   
 
2. Do the problems vary across different perspectives? 
a. What are the MAJCOM, Wing, Group, and/or Squadron views? 
b. Do these interpretations differ across the board?   
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3. Does AFI 10-201 or future upgrades address the perceived issues with the current 
SORTS reporting system? 
 
The sample of the population of military members who utilized SORTS consisted of at 
least thirty personnel assigned to various organizational levels in the ACC and AMC 
MAJCOMs.  The goal of my study was to classify issues with SORTS that were not 
identified in previous research.  Therefore, ensuring a good blend of respondents at all 
levels, in both MAJCOMS, and of various ranks was not measured because it was not the 
main focus. 
All of the respondents were volunteers that either input and/or used the data for the 
SORTS report.  Data collection and analysis was conducted in a “two-stage” approach. 
First Stage.  The first stage of this study relied heavily on AFI-10-201 and other 
limited, existing literature.  This stage was outlined by the first investigative question and 
a portion of the third question.  The first investigative question was answered through a 
literature review and by researching AFI 10-201 to find out SORTS’ objectives.  The 
literature reviewed also discussed problems with SORTS, showing how the current 
information is insufficient.  A portion of the third question was answered through 
conversations (via telephone or email) with OPRs at the HAF and MAJCOM levels.  
Issues were addressed by comparing concerns identified in this thesis with AFI-10-201 to 
determine if the current instruction already addressed them. 
Second Phase.  The second half of the first investigative question and the second 
investigative question were answered by surveying MAJCOM, Wing, Group, and 
Squadron leaders to find out if they had any problems with the current system.  This data 
was collected and organized by common issues, looking for similarities as well as 
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differences.  Inputs were analyzed to see if there were common problems or identified 
key differences with the various levels of involvement, such as unit level, MAJCOM, and 
rank of the respondents.  Responses were compiled in the areas of agreement as well as 
disagreement in order to form basic analysis and lessons learned for future 
recommendations.  The third investigative question was also addressed by researching to 
first find out if there were any future upgrades to SORTS and then determining if these 
upgrades addressed the identified concerns. 
Delphi 
     The Delphi survey method may be characterized as a technique for structuring a group 
communication process so that the process was effective in allowing a group of 
individuals, as a whole, to deal with a complex problem.  Members of a group were 
questioned anonymously via email and asked to list and explain issues.  The responses 
were grouped with similar answers.  The goal of the Delphi method is to collect and 
organize judgments in a systematic fashion.  This technique gains input, establishes 
priorities, and builds consensus.  Delphi organizes and helps focus dissent, turning this 
group effect into a window of opportunity.  At the same time, the subjects’ identities are 
protected, and group responses are consolidated by eliminating extraneous material and 
assuring each respondent’s input is included in the final responses.  This reduces the 
pressures of group conformity by revealing a range of responses submitted.   
     This thesis should be classified as a “modified” Delphi study.  Only one set of surveys 
were distributed to the subjects, and Delphi studies usually require several iterations of 
interviews. 
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Justification of Approach 
     In order to determine if the current SORTS reporting system was effective; a survey 
was developed to solicit input from experts in the field using the system.  Questions were 
general and less-threatening, progressing slowly to more specific areas.  Simple “yes or 
no” answers were avoided in order to encourage thorough responses from subjects.  This 
involved a situation where no historical records or data was available, so data in this 
thesis relied heavily on the efficient use of intuition and judgment of a group of persons 
who had experience and knowledge in the subject area.  This was why the Delphi 
technique was used.  This technique was designed to elicit opinions from a group with the 
aim of generating a group response.  ‘Delphi replaces direct confrontation and debate by 
a carefully planned, anonymous, and orderly program of sequential individual 
interrogations usually conducted by questionnaires” (Wellman, 2003:30).  The following 
questions built the framework for the survey used in this thesis, regardless of whether the 
respondent was an information provider, user, or both. 
1. What are the key problems with the current SORTS reporting system?   
 
a. What is the information used for? 
 
b. How is the current information insufficient? 
 
2. Do the problems vary across different perspectives? 
a. What are the MAJCOM, Wing, Group, and/or Squadron views?   
b. Do these interpretations differ across the board?     
3. Does AFI 10-201 or future upgrades address the perceived issues with the current 
SORTS reporting system? 
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     Surveys were distributed by MAJCOM SORTS POCs.  They forwarded the surveys to 
their subordinate SORTS POCs to solicit volunteers within the ACC and AMC 
MAJCOMs, in order to obtain feedback from personnel who used SORTS in the field.  
Respondents were located at various bases worldwide from the wing, group, and 
squadron levels, and the ranks ranged from Airman First Class to Lieutenant Colonel.  
Respondents emailed responses directly to this thesis’ committee so data could be 
compiled according to similar issues.   
     The response rate for this study was not tracked.  As previously stated, the goal of this 
thesis was to identify issues with SORTS that were not documented in previous research.  
Therefore, surveys were sent to as many ACC and AMC personnel as possible who used 
SORTS in order to simply gather data and identify issues.  Once the responses were 
categorized, contingency tables were constructed with actual and expected values based 
on three treatments:  organizational level, MAJCOM, and rank.  The three treatments 
were arbitrarily selected to study because there is nothing to base these selections on.  
Contingency tables were most commonly analyzed using the chi-square statistic because 
the purpose of the chi-square is to compare observed results with expected results to see 
if the result is likely.  Therefore, Chi-Square analysis was conducted to determine if all 
categories carried equal prevalence.  Then, several other Chi-Square analyses were 
performed to find out if various treatments such as organizational level, MAJCOM, or 
rank influenced respondents’ inputs.   
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IV. Results And Analysis 
Overview 
     This chapter discusses the findings from the Chi-Square analyses conducted in this 
study to determine if the issues found, if any exist, were all of equal prevalence.  Also, 
this chapter evaluated various treatments such as organizational level, MAJCOM, or rank 
to find out if they affected respondents’ view of SORTS.  Then, issues raised will be 
compared to a current initiative called the Enhanced Status of Resources and Training 
System (ESORTS) that was designed to improve SORTS’ capabilities.  
The Research Process 
     The research was conducted as described in Chapter Three.  However, there are 
important aspects that need to be highlighted in order to gain a complete understanding of 
this study.  These aspects are response rate and sample size.   
     As indicated previously, the survey response rate or sample sizes for each treatment 
was not tracked.  The intent of this study was to identify issues with SORTS that were not 
previously documented in past research.  Forty-two surveys were received but seven were 
blank.  As a result, thirty-five respondents’ inputs were used for this study.      
     Sample size for each treatment was not at least 5 subjects.  In Chi-Square analyses, at 
least 5 subjects per group are needed in order to detect any differences.  Since all sample 
sizes in this study do not contain at least 5 subjects per issues per treatment, there is a 
tendency for a difference not to show up when it really does exist ((McClave, Benson, 
and Sincich, 2001:961). 
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Investigative Questions 
     Through the distribution of surveys, this study polled experts in the field currently 
using SORTS to answer the following questions and establish a framework for future 
studies: 
1. What are the key problems with the current SORTS reporting system?   
 
a. What is the information used for? 
 
The literature review provided the answer to this question.  AFI 10-210 defines SORTS 
as an internal tool for use by the Chairman Joint Chiefs of Staff (CJCS), Services, 
Unified Commands, and Combat Support Agencies.  It is the single automated reporting 
system within the DoD that functions as the central registry of all operational units of the 
U.S. Armed Forces and certain foreign organizations.  There are three main purposes for 
this system:  1) provide critical data to crisis planning; 2) provide data for the deliberate 
planning process; and 3) to be used by the CSAF and subordinate commanders in 
assessing their effectiveness in meeting their Title 10, United States Code responsibility 
(AFI 10-201, 2003:8). SORTS is designed to support crisis response planning; deliberate 
or peacetime planning and provide the Chairman with Service-unique information 
regarding a measured unit.  SORTS is the DoD’s automated reporting system that 
identifies the current level of selected resources and training status of a unit or in other 
words its ability to carry out its wartime mission.  Units report their overall readiness 
status as well as the status of four resource areas:  personnel, equipment and supplies on 
hand, equipment condition, and training.  As a resource and unit monitoring system, 
SORTS indicates the level of selected resources and training status required to undertake 
the full mission set for which a unit is organized or designed to do.   
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b. How is the current information insufficient? 
 
The second half of the first investigative question was answered by surveying MAJCOM, 
Wing, Group, and Squadron personnel currently using SORTS in the field.  Forty-two 
surveys were received, but seven were blank.  Therefore, 35 surveys were used in this 
study.  Their responses were grouped with similar concerns to determine if users have 
encountered the same problems with the system.  The responses were grouped by similar 
concerns, showing a frequency count of issues for each of the eleven categories.  This 
data is shown in Table 1 on the next page. 
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Table 1.  Overall Information Per Respondent 
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AMC Sq SO 1 1
AMC Sq SE 2 1 1
ACC Sq SE 3 1
ACC Sq SE 4 1
ACC Sq SO 5 1
ACC Sq SO 6 1
ACC Sq SO 7 1
AMC Sq SE 8 1
AMC Sq SE 9 1
AMC Sq SE 10 1
AMC Sq SO 11 1 1 1
AMC Wg JE 12 1
AMC Sq JO 13 1
AMC Sq SO 14 1 1
AMC Wg SE 15 1 1
AMC Sq SO 16 1
AMC Sq JE 17 1 1 1
AMC Sq JE 18 1
AMC Sq JE 19 1
AMC Wg SE 20 1 1 1 1
ACC Sq JE 21 1 1
ACC Sq SO 22 1 1 1 1
ACC Sq SE 23 1 1 1
ACC Sq SO 24 1 1 1 1
ACC Sq JE 25 1
ACC Sq SO 26 1
ACC Wg JE 27 1 1 1
AMC Sq JE 28 1 1
ACC Wg JE 29 1 1
ACC Sq SO 30 1 1
AMC Gp JO 31 1 1 1 1 1
ACC Sq SO 32 1 1
AMC Sq JO 33 1
AMC Sq SE 34 1
ACC Sq JO 35 1
Total 2 10 10 2 6 15 7 4 2 2 4
Total Issues 58 Total Non-Issues 6  
 
 
Senior Officer (SO) = Majors and Lieutenant Colonels 
Junior Officer (JO) = Lieutenants and Captains 
Senior Enlisted (SE) = Technical Sergeant – Chief Master Sergeant 
Junior Enlisted (JE) = Airman Basic – Staff Sergeant 
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The main issues listed on the previous page in Table 1 were defined by the respondents 
as: 
a. Effectiveness.  Respondent was not certain higher levels in the AF used the data 
effectively to make decisions.  Wing level needed a system to prevent haphazard 
reporting. 
 
b. Accuracy.  Respondents felt there needed to be a way to ensure data was accurate 
when it was placed in the system. 
 
c. Redundancy.  Respondents felt ART and SORTS were redundant processes that 
needed to be combined.   
 
d. ART.  Respondents felt ART was more effective and should be used instead of 
SORTS, or the respondents felt ART should not be used at all. 
 
e. Technology.  Respondents felt the system needed to be automated and 
streamlined at the unit levels to ensure timely, accurate data. 
 
f. Format.  Respondents felt they should report the way they deploy—not as a unit 
or squadron. 
 
g. Training.  Respondents felt a more comprehensive SORTS training program 
needed to be implemented. 
 
h. Confusing.  Respondents felt the instructions were not in plain text and difficult 
to understand. 
 
i. Comprehensive Checklist.  Respondents felt an all encompassing checklist 
needed to be created. 
 
j. New to the System.  Respondent felt they had not worked with SORTS long to 
provide constructive feedback.  
 
k. None.  The Respondent was satisfied with the current system. 
 
Table 1 also provides information such as organizational level, MAJCOM, and rank of 
each respondent to identify if the member was a member of ACC or AMC and whether 
he or she worked at the Wing, Group, or Squadron level.  The rank of the respondent is 
also included.  The respondent was either categorized as a senior or junior officer or 
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enlisted member.  There were 64 total inputs collected.  Fifty-eight were considered 
issues, and six were considered non-issues because they fell in the “New To the System” 
or “None” categories.  Now that the issues have been identified, it is time to determine if 
various treatments have an effect on the respondents’ views. 
 
2. Do the problems vary across different perspectives? 
a. What are the MAJCOM, Wing, Group, and/or Squadron views?   
The next step was to identify the frequency of issues based on treatments: 
 
Table 2.  Issues Breakdown By Organizational Level 
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Wg 0 1 1 0 1 4 3 1 1 0 0 12
Gp 0 1 1 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 5
Sq 2 8 8 1 4 10 4 3 1 2 4 41
Total 2 10 10 2 6 15 7 4 2 2 4 58  
 
 
Table 2 shown above displays the actual breakdown of concerns based on the 
organizational level of involvement of the respondents.  The last column displays the 
total number of issues broken down by organizational level.  The frequency count of each 
issue is shown in the bottom row labeled “Total” and also equals the totals of issues per 
respondent listed in Table 1.   
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     The next chart depicts the frequency count of issues based on the respondent’s 
MAJCOM: 
 
Table 3.  Issues Breakdown By MAJCOM 
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ACC 1 2 5 1 4 9 2 3 0 1 1 27
AMC 1 8 5 1 2 6 5 1 2 1 3 31
Total 2 10 10 2 6 15 7 4 2 2 4 58  
 
 
     Table 3 shows the actual breakdown of categories based on the MAJCOM of the 
respondents.  Since there were only two MAJCOMS used in this study, the respondent is 
either a member of ACC or AMC.  The last column shows the total number of issues 
broken down by MAJCOM.  As noted previously, the frequency count of each issue is 
shown in the bottom row labeled “Total” and also equals the totals of issues per 
respondent listed in Table 1. 
     The next page shows Table 4, which displays the breakdown of categories based on 
the respondents’ rank: 
 
 
 
 36
Table 4.  Issues Breakdown by Rank 
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SO 2 5 5 0 2 6 1 1 0 0 1 22
JO 0 1 1 1 1 1 0 1 0 2 0 6
SE 0 3 3 1 1 2 3 1 1 0 2 15
JE 0 1 1 0 2 6 3 1 1 0 1 15
Total 2 10 10 2 6 15 7 4 2 2 4 58  
 
Senior Officer (SO) = Majors and Lieutenant Colonels 
Junior Officer (JO) = Lieutenants and Captains 
Senior Enlisted (SE) = Technical Sergeant to Chief Master Sergeant 
Junior Enlisted (JE) = Airman Basic to Staff Sergeant 
 
 
The chart above shows the actual breakdown of categories based on the rank of the 
respondents.  Respondent fell into one of four categories:  senior officer, junior officer, 
senior enlisted, or junior enlisted.  The last column shows the total number of issues 
broken down by rank.  As noted previously, the frequency count of each issue is shown in 
the bottom row labeled “Total” and also equals the totals of issues per respondent listed 
in Table 1. 
     The various perspectives and frequency of issues based on different treatments 
(organizational level, MAJCOM, and rank) are listed previously in Tables 2, Table 3, and 
Table 4.   Next, Chi-Square analysis was conducted to determine if the treatments 
affected how the respondents viewed SORTS. 
 37
b. Do these interpretations differ across the board?     
     Chi-Square analysis was conducted to determine if there were differences in SORTS’ 
interpretations across the board.  Prior to the Chi-Square Tests, expected values for each 
of the three treatments were calculated.  The expected values were based on the 
percentage of respondents per treatment that participated in this study.  The chart below,       
     Table 5, shows the weighted percentage of respondents based upon organizational 
level: 
 
Table 5.  Issues Breakdown (Weighted Percentages) By Organizational Level 
 
 
 
Level Ef
fe
ct
iv
en
es
s
A
cc
ur
ac
y
Re
du
nd
an
cy
AR
T
Te
ch
no
lo
gy
Fo
rm
at
Tr
ai
ni
ng
C
on
fu
si
ng
C
om
pr
eh
en
si
ve
 C
he
ck
lis
t
N
ew
 to
 th
e 
sy
st
em
N
on
e
To
ta
l w
/ I
ss
ue
s
Pe
rc
en
ta
g 
of
 
R
es
po
nd
en
ts
 
w
/ I
ss
ue
s
Wg 0 1 1 0 1 4 3 1 1 0 0 12 0.21
Gp 0 1 1 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 5 0.09
Sq 2 8 8 1 4 10 4 3 1 2 4 41 0.71
Total 2 10 10 2 6 15 7 4 2 2 4 58 1  
 
 
Table 5 displays the actual breakdown of concerns based on the organizational level of 
involvement of the respondents.  This chart is similar to Table 2, but the last column 
displays the total number of issues based on the percentage of respondents from each 
organizational level.  The frequency count of each issue is shown in the bottom row 
labeled “Total” and also equals the totals of issues per respondent listed in Table 1.   
     Table 6 on the next page shows the expected values for the organizational level 
treatment: 
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Table 6.  Issues Breakdown (Expected Values) By Organizational Level 
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Wg 0.41 2.07 2.07 0.41 1.24 3.10 1.45 0.83 0.41
Gp 0.17 0.86 0.86 0.17 0.52 1.29 0.60 0.34 0.17
Sq 1.41 7.07 7.07 1.41 4.24 10.60 4.95 2.83 1.41
Total 2.00 10.00 10.00 2.00 6.00 15.00 7.00 4.00 2.00  
 
 
The chart above portrays the expected number of issues based on the percentage of 
respondents from each organizational level.  Expected values were computed by 
multiplying the weighted percentage of each organizational level by the total number for 
that issue. 
     Table 7 on the next page depicts the weighted percentage of respondents based upon 
their MAJCOM: 
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Table 7.  Issues Breakdown (Weighted Percentages) By MAJCOM 
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ACC 1 2 5 1 4 9 2 3 0 1 1 27 0.465517
AMC 1 8 5 1 2 6 5 1 2 1 3 31 0.534483
Total 2 10 10 2 6 15 7 4 2 2 4 58 1  
 
 
Table 7 displays the actual breakdown of concerns based on the MAJCOM of the 
respondents.  This chart is similar to Table 3, but the last column displays the total 
number of issues based on the percentage of respondents that participated from each of 
the two MAJCOMs.  The frequency count of each issue is shown in the bottom row 
labeled “Total” and also equals the totals of issues per respondent listed in Table 1.   
     Table 8 shows the expected values for each MAJCOM: 
 
Table 8.  Issues Breakdown (Expected Values) By MAJCOM 
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ACC 0.93 4.66 4.66 0.93 2.79 6.98 3.26 1.86 0.93
AMC 1.07 5.34 5.34 1.07 3.21 8.02 3.74 2.14 1.07
Total 2.00 10.00 10.00 2.00 6.00 15.00 7.00 4.00 2.00  
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The chart on the previous page displays the expected number of issues based on the 
percentage of respondents from each MAJCOM.  Expected values were computed by 
multiplying the weighted percentage of each MAJCOM by the total number for that 
issue. 
     Table 9 lists the weighted percentages of respondents based for each rank: 
 
Table 9.  Issues Breakdown (Weighted Percentages) By Rank 
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SO 2 5 5 0 2 6 1 1 0 0 1 22 0.38
JO 0 1 1 1 1 1 0 1 0 2 0 6 0.10
SE 0 3 3 1 1 2 3 1 1 0 2 15 0.26
JE 0 1 1 0 2 6 3 1 1 0 1 15 0.26
Total 2 10 10 2 6 15 7 4 2 2 4 58 1  
Senior Officer (SO) = Majors and Lieutenant Colonels 
Junior Officer (JO) = Lieutenants and Captains 
Senior Enlisted (SE) = Technical Sergeant to Chief Master Sergeant 
Junior Enlisted (JE) = Airman Basic to Staff Sergeant 
 
 
Table 9 displays the actual breakdown of concerns based on the rank of the respondents.  
This chart is similar to Table 4, but the last column displays the total number of issues 
based on the percentage of respondents that participated from the four rank divisions.  
The frequency count of each issue is shown in the bottom row labeled “Total” and also 
equals the totals of issues per respondent listed in Table 1.   
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 The next chart shows the expected values for each rank: 
 
Table 10.  Issues Breakdown (Expected Values) By Rank 
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SO 0.76 3.79 3.79 0.76 2.28 5.69 2.66 1.52 0.76
JO 0.21 1.03 1.03 0.21 0.62 1.55 0.72 0.41 0.21
SE 0.52 2.59 2.59 0.52 1.55 3.88 1.81 1.03 0.52
JE 0.52 2.59 2.59 0.52 1.55 3.88 1.81 1.03 0.52
Total 2.00 10.00 10.00 2.00 6.00 15.00 7.00 4.00 2.00  
 
Senior Officer (SO) = Majors and Lieutenant Colonels 
Junior Officer (JO) = Lieutenants and Captains 
Senior Enlisted (SE) = Technical Sergeant to Chief Master Sergeant 
Junior Enlisted (JE) = Airman Basic to Staff Sergeant 
 
 
The chart above displays the expected number of issues based on the percentage of 
respondents from each of the four rank divisions.  Expected values were computed by 
multiplying the weighted percentage of each rank by the total number for that issue. 
     Chi-Square statistics were calculated for each set of actual and expected values in the 
contingency tables above.  Since there are 11 total issues in this study, with 58 being the 
total number of issues, each issue should carry an equal weight of 5.27 in the first test.  
The four tests gave the following results on the next page in Table 11 based on the p-
value, or acceptable error rate, which was equal to alpha.   
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Table 11.  Chi-Square Analyses Summary 
 
 
 
 
Null 
Hypothesis(Ho) 
Alternate 
Hypothesis (Ha) 
P-Value Chi-Square 
Statistic 
Decision 
There was no 
difference in 
prevalance for 
the issues 
identified. 
At least one issue 
differed in 
prevalance. 
.05 .0000901157 Reject Null 
Hypothesis 
The treatment 
organizational 
level had an 
effect on the 
respondents’ 
issues. 
The treatment 
organizational 
level had no 
effect on the 
respondents’ 
issues. 
.05 .773 Fail To Reject 
Null Hypothesis 
The treatment 
MAJCOM had 
an effect on the 
respondents’ 
issues. 
The treatment 
MAJCOM had 
no effect on the 
respondents’ 
issues. 
.05 .34918 Fail To Reject 
Null Hypothesis 
The treatment 
rank had an 
effect on the 
respondents’ 
issues. 
The treatment 
rank had no 
effect on the 
respondents’ 
issues. 
.05 .699227 
 
Fail To Reject 
Null Hypothesis 
 
 
p-value < alpha, reject the null hypothesis   
p-value > alpha, fail to reject the null hypothesis 
 
 
 
 
Each of the four tests contained a null and alternative hypothesis, p-values, Chi-Square 
Statistics, and a decision based on a Chi-Square statistics and p-value comparison.   The 
first test was conducted to determine if there was a difference in prevalence with the 
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issues identified in this thesis.  The next three tests were performed to determine if 
organizational level, MAJCOM, rank had any affect on how respondents viewed SORTS. 
      The first two investigative questions have been answered, so it is time to address the 
final question.   
 
3. Does AFI 10-201 or future upgrades address the perceived issues with the 
current SORTS reporting system? 
 
     Further literature reviews and HAF and MAJCOM POCs assisted in answering the 
last investigative question.  At the time of this thesis, there was an initiative still in the 
planning stages and its goal is to revamp the SORTS program.   
“The Chief of Staff of the Air Force saw the need to address readiness 
reporting not only at the unit (squadron) level but also at the UTC 
level…it was incapable of capturing the requisite data since it was 
designed for the unit level and therefore did not provide visibility on the 
packets (UTCs) that make up the basic building blocks for sourcing 
requirements” (Morton&Tillson, 2002:6).   
 
ESORTS 
     This initiative is entitled the Enhanced Status of Resources and Training System or 
ESORTS.  ESORTS is defined as an: 
…automated, near real-time readiness reporting system that provides 
resource standards and current readiness status for operational forces and 
defense support organizations in terms of their ability to perform their 
mission essential tasks.  Establishes a relationship between resource and 
training inputs and readiness to perform MET based on standards 
established by the parent DoD component (DODD 7730.65, 2002:8). 
 
This system is built upon SORTS and will provide insights into the current unit and 
organizational readiness status and resources standards (DODD 7730.65, 2002:3).  
ESORTS is a result of the Department of Defense Readiness Reporting System (DRRS), 
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which will change the format of readiness reporting from a simple statement of the 
overall status of resources and training, to one specifically focusing on the tasks the units 
or squadrons perform (Morton&Tillson, 2002:8).  The new system is designed to provide 
commanders at all levels a greater degree of granularity, both in terms of readiness and in 
terms of task/mission accomplishment (Morton&Tillson, 2002:7). 
     Based on feedback from experts in the field, the issues identified in this study were 
compared to the ESORTS initiative to determine if the AF has moved in the right 
direction and is addressing current concerns.  The table on the following page displays 
the results of this comparison based upon the assumption that ESORTS will be 
implemented. 
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Table 12.  Issues vs. ESORTS Comparison 
 
 
 
 
ISSUE Does ESORTS Address? 
Effectiveness Yes.  The new system is designed to provide commanders 
at all levels a greater degree of granularity, both in terms 
of readiness and in terms of task/mission accomplishment 
(Morton&Tillson, 2002:7). 
Accuracy Yes.  ESORTS will provide more information to 
commanders because they will have near, real-time and 
direct knowledge of the readiness status at the succeeding 
hierarchal levels and have direct knowledge of the 
readiness status of each MET associated with a UTC 
(Morton&Tillson, 2002:8). 
Redundancy Yes.  ART is similar in many aspects to ESORTS and it 
will be easy to transition from ART to ESORTS 
(Morton&Tillson, 2002:8). 
ART Yes.  ESORTS will provide more information to 
commanders because they will have direct knowledge of 
the readiness status at the succeeding hierarchal levels.  
They will have direct knowledge of the readiness status 
of each MET associated with a UTC.  This is similar to 
ART, but ESORTS will aggregate UTCs into AEF 
METs. (Morton&Tillson, 2002:8). 
Technology Yes. The system is an automated, near real-time readiness 
reporting system that provides resource standards and 
current readiness status for operational forces and defense 
support organizations in terms of their ability to perform 
their mission essential tasks (DODD 7730.65, 2002:8). 
Format Yes.  ESORTS will report readiness specifically focusing 
on the tasks the units or squadrons perform 
(Morton&Tillson, 2002:8). 
Training No. ESORTS does not address operational training.  
However, ESORTS will highlight deficiencies in the 
areas of training, personnel, equipment, ordnance, and 
sustainment (DODD 7730.65, 2002:3). 
Confusing No 
Comprehensive Checklist No 
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Table 12 lists the 9 categories defined as issues in the left column.  The right column 
answers the question “Does ESORTS address?”  This was done to determine if the Air 
Force was moving in the right direction with upgrading SORTS.  The ESORTS initiative 
addressees six of the nine issues listed above.  Effectiveness, Accuracy, Redundancy, 
ART, Technology, and Format are discussed in ESORTS literature.  All of these 
upgrades planned for these categories will augment existing capabilities for a better total 
system.  The areas of Training (operational), Confusing (Text), and Comprehensive 
Checklist were not mentioned in the ESORTS literature.  However, AFI 10-210 did 
undergo extensive revisions in December 2003, which added over 70 pages of guidance 
to help clarify and identify proper reporting procedures.  Although this was done to make 
an improvement in SORTS reporting, Confusing Text was still identified on the survey, 
which means it is still a concern to some users.    
     This chapter discusses the findings in this study based on the research questions 
identified in Chapter One.  In addition, the chapter also categorized the respondents’ 
feedback from the surveys they submitted.  From that data, issues were identified and 
tested to determine if they differed in prevalence.  Also, the organizational level, 
MAJCOM, and ranks of each respondent were analyzed to determine if they had an affect 
on respondents’ views.  Finally, the issues identified were compared to a future initiative 
designed to revamp SORTS to determine if the issues identified would be addressed.   
     The next chapter will identify the findings in this study.  In addition, recommendations 
for future readiness reporting will be made based on this finding in this study.  Finally, 
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ideas for future research concerning SORTS and readiness reporting in the Air Force will 
be discussed. 
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V. Findings and Recommendations 
     This chapter presents the findings reached during this study.  The discussion offers 
recommendations based on these findings and suggestions for future research.   
     As stated previously, the Delphi method allows a group of individuals, as a whole, to 
deal with a complex problem by grouping similar answers to build a consensus.  Based 
on the issues identified and the four Chi-Square tests conducted in this study, the 
following findings were discovered.   
Finding 1 
     The first finding validates that issues are present with the current SORTS reporting 
system.  The first test was to determine if the issues identified differed in prevalence, or 
in other words, was one issue listed more than the others.  The null hypothesis stated, 
“There was no difference in prevalence for the issues identified,” and the alternative 
hypothesis stated, “At least one issue differed in importance.”  Chi-Square analysis 
compared actual and expected frequency counts of each issue.  Based on a Chi-Square 
statistic of .0000901157, which was significantly less than the p-value, or acceptable 
error rate, of 5%, the null hypothesis was rejected.  Therefore, there was a difference in 
prevalence on at least one of the issues noted by the respondents in this study.   
     Of the eleven categories identified, Format was the most prevalent category in this 
study.  Problem with format was the reason for the ESORTS initiative.  This supports the 
idea that the Air Force is moving in the right directions to make improvements with 
SORTS.   
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Finding 2 
     The second test was used to determine if organizational level influenced respondents’ 
views.  The null hypothesis stated, “The treatment organizational level appeared to have 
no effect on the respondents’ issues,” and the alternative hypothesis stated, “The 
treatment organizational level appeared to have an effect on the respondents’ issues.”  
Chi-Square analysis compared actual and expected frequency counts of each issue based 
on the treatment factor of organizational level.  Based on a Chi-Square statistic of .773, 
which was significantly greater than the p-value, or acceptable error rate, of 5%, the 
decision was to fail to reject the null hypothesis.  Therefore, the treatment or factor, 
organizational level, appeared to have no affect on the respondents’ view of the SORTS 
reporting system.   
Finding 3 
     In the next test, the null hypothesis stated, “The treatment MAJCOM appeared to have 
no effect on the respondents’ issues,” and the alternative hypothesis stated, “The 
treatment MAJCOM appeared to have no effect on the respondents’ issues.”  Further Chi-
Square analysis compared actual and expected frequency counts of each issue based on 
the MAJCOM treatment factor.  This test produced a Chi-Square statistic of .34918, 
which was significantly greater than the p-value, or acceptable error rate, of 5%, so the 
decision was to fail to reject the null hypothesis.  Therefore, the treatment or factor, 
MAJCOM, appeared to have no affect on the respondents’ view of the SORTS reporting 
system.  
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Finding 4 
     The last Chi-Square analysis compared actual and expected frequency counts of each 
issue based on the treatment factor of rank.  The null hypothesis stated, “The treatment 
rank appeared to have no effect on the respondents’ issues,” and the alternative 
hypothesis stated, “The treatment rank appeared to have an effect on the respondents’ 
issues.”  Based on a Chi-Square statistic of .699227, which was significantly greater than 
the p-value, or acceptable error rate, of 5%, the decision was to fail to reject the null 
hypothesis.  Therefore, the treatment or factor, rank, appeared to have no affect on the 
respondents’ view of the SORTS reporting system.   
Other Recommendations 
     This study showed there are various concerns with readiness reporting.  This process 
should be monitored on a regular basis because there are various threats worldwide.  
Also, feedback from experts who have used the system was also valuable information and 
should always be considered. 
     Nine issues were identified, and ESORTS did not address three:  better operational 
training, the need for a comprehensive checklist and confusing text.  These issues should 
be considered before the ESORTS initiative is implemented.  Also, there could possibly 
be other issues that exist, but there were only nine issues identified in this study.  Other 
studies should be conducted to determine if other issues exist. 
     There are unlimited possibilities that exist for future research.  Additional studies 
could include tests to determine the affects of other treatments pertaining to SORTS 
functionality such as operational personnel vs. logisticians’ views of the system.  Also, 
tests could be conducted to determine if personnel who are “new to the system” and 
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personnel who are “not new to the system” have similar issues with SORTS within their 
own groups and/or with the opposing group.  Another study may categorize the issues in 
another fashion, which could produce different results.  In addition, total years in service, 
educational level, and AFSCs could also be possible treatments to study.  The final 
recommendation consists of ranking the importance of the 11 issues found in this study.  
The issues could be presented to respondents in which they would rank relevant issue’s 
importance from greatest to least.  Then a Chi-Square Test could be conducted to 
determine the hierarchy of the issues to ensure the issues with the most importance is 
definitely addressed within any improvements to the system.   
     There is a lot to be learned by evaluating readiness reporting, particularly the SORTS.  
They are critical topics, which is why it is very important to evaluate the system’s 
effectiveness on a regular basis and get feedback from personnel using the system in the 
field.  This must be done to ensure units are prepared to carry out their wartime mission, 
and the system used to measure units is adequate and effective.   
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Appendix A. 
SORTS Analysis Survey 
 
Purpose:  The status of resources and training system (SORTS) is a process that measures the “health” of 
units and wings in day-to-day preparedness and the ability to execute a major theater war or other scenario 
envisioned in the national security strategy.  With talk of the current reporting system not accurately 
reflecting units’ readiness, it is time to evaluate the system to identify key problems and re-design the 
process to better reflect units’ capabilities.  The objective of this thesis is to inform Air Force leadership of 
the current state of the SORTS system to ensure it is adequate.  By surveying current MAJCOM, Wing, 
Group, and Squadron leadership on their interpretations of how the system works, we can find out if there 
are common problems, if any, that all key stakeholders are encountering. 
 
Participation.  We would greatly appreciate your completing this survey.  Your participation is 
COMPLETELY VOLUNTARY.  However, your input is important for us to evaluate the process.  You 
may withdraw from this study at any time without penalty, and any data that have been collected about you, 
as long as those data are identifiable, can be withdrawn by contacting Captain Tia A. Jordan.  Your 
decision to participate or withdraw will not jeopardize your relationship with your organization, the Air 
Force Institute of Technology, the Air Force, or the Department of Defense. 
 
Confidentiality.  ALL ANSWERS ARE STRICTLY CONFIDENTIAL AND ANONYMOUS.  No one 
other than Captain Tia A. Jordan (assigned at the Air Force Institute of Technology which is an 
organization independent of your organization) will ever see your questionnaire.  Findings will be reported 
at MAJCOM, Wing, Group, and Squadron levels only.  We ask for some demographic and unit information 
in order to interpret results more accurately, and in order to link responses for an entire unit.  Reports 
summarizing trends in large groups may be published.   
 
Questionnaire responses will be stored on the Air Force Institute of Technology’s secure server.  This 
makes it impossible for your leaders to circumvent Captain Tia A. Jordan and try to access any identifiable 
data without her knowledge.  Second, responses will be grouped together and not linked to individuals.  
You will only know which responses you provided.  Finally, the database is protected by a password that is 
known only by Captain Tia A. Jordan making it impossible to access your data.   
 
I have read the above information and am willing to participate in the study. 
 
Contact information:  If you have any questions or comments about the survey contact Captain Tia A. 
Jordan at the number, mailing address, or e-mail address. 
 
 
Captain Tia A. Jordan 
AFIT/ENS   BLDG 642 
2950 P Street 
Wright-Patterson AFB  OH  45433-7765 
Email: tia.jordan@afit.edu 
Phone: DSN 785-6565, ext. 6169, commercial (937) 785-6565, ext. 6169 
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AIR FORCE RESEARCH LABORATORY SPONSORED
ANALYSIS OF THE CURRENT AF-SPECIFIC STATUS OF RESOURCES AND TRAINING 
SYSTEM (SORTS) REPORTING PROCESS STUDY 
 
SORTS ANALYSIS SURVEY 
 
 
INFORMATION ABOUT THIS STUDY 
 
Thank you for participating in this research project.  Your participation in this survey is strictly 
VOLUNTARY.  Your work experience will make an important contribution to the goals of this research 
project. 
 
Confidentiality of your responses:  This information is being collected for research purposes only.  The 
write up and analysis of the SORTS reporting system will be based on cumulative survey responses.  No 
one in your unit, base, or MAJCOM will EVER be allowed to see your individual responses.  You are 
welcome to discuss this questionnaire with anyone you choose, but please wait until they have had a chance 
to participate. 
 
 
PRIVACY ACT STATEMENT 
 
In accordance with AFI 37-132, paragraph 3.2, the information below is provided as required by the 
Privacy Act of 1974. 
Authority:  10 U.S.C. 8012, Secretary of the Air Force; powers and duties; delegation by; implemented by 
AFI 36-2601, USAF Survey Program. 
Purpose:  To evaluate the current SORTS reporting system to determine if it is effective in measuring 
unit’s readiness.   
Routine Use:  To increase understanding of the SORTS reporting system.  No analyses of individual 
responses will be conducted. Reports summarizing trends in large groups of people may be published. 
Disclosure:  Participation is VOLUNTARY.  No adverse action will be taken against any member who 
does not participate in this survey or who does not complete any part of this survey. 
 
 
BACKGROUND INFORMATION 
 
This information will be used to develop a profile of the participants in this study.  Your responses will be 
kept completely confidential.  These items are very important for statistical purposes. 
 
 
INSTRUCTIONS 
 
1.  Please write your name, rank, and office symbol in the spaces provided below. All responses will be 
kept confidential and anonymous; the information requested on this page will be used for tracking purposes 
only. 
 
2.  Read the INFORMATION ABOUT THIS RESEARCH STUDY and PRIVACY ACT information and 
answer the following questions. 
 
The success of this project depends on the accuracy of the information you provide.  Please do your 
best to be honest.  Your responses will be kept confidential. 
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ACC                AMC             (Please circle appropriate MAJCOM) 
 
 
1.  Rank: _________  
  
 
 
2.  Level of Your Involvement With SORTS (circle one): __MAJCOM__ Wing__ Group__ Squadron 
 
 
  
3.  Primary nature of your involvement:   
 
User of SORTS information      ______% 
 Input SORTS data                      ______% 
 
 
 
4.  How old are you? _____ 
 
 
 
5.  Highest education level completed? 
 (a)  Did not complete High School 
 (b)  High School Diploma or GED 
 (c)  2-Year College Degree 
 (d)  4-Year College Degree 
 (e)  Graduate Degree 
 
 
 
6.  How long have you worked for the Air Force?  
 _____years______months 
 
 
7.  How long have you worked with in your current job?  
 _____years______months 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
8.  How long have you worked with SORTS?    
 ____years______months 
 
 
 
 
9.  What is your current skill level?    Enlisted_________     Officer_________   
 
 
 
 
10.  What is your AFSC? _______________________ 
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11.  As a user/provider (or both) of SORTS data, what is the problem(s), if any, with the  
       current system?  (Please rank your response(s) with “1” being the greatest concern as so  
       forth until all responses are assigned a number.) 
______________________________________________________________________________________
______________________________________________________________________________________
______________________________________________________________________________________
______________________________________________________________________________________
______________________________________________________________________________________
______________________________________________________________________________________
______________________________________________________________________________________
______________________________________________________________________________________
______________________________________________________________________________________
______________________________________________________________________________________
______________________________________________________________________________________
______________________________________________________________________________________
______________________________________________________________________________________
______________________________________________________________________________________
______________________________________________________________________________________
______________________________________________________________________________________
______________________________________________________________________________________
______________________________________________________________________________________
______________________________________________________________________________________
______________________________________________________________________________________
______________________________________________________________________________________
______________________________________________________________________________________
______________________________________________________________________________________
______________________________________________________________________________________
______________________________________________________________________________________
 
12.  Is the current system effective in measuring units’ readiness?  Please explain.   
______________________________________________________________________________________
______________________________________________________________________________________
______________________________________________________________________________________
______________________________________________________________________________________
______________________________________________________________________________________
______________________________________________________________________________________
______________________________________________________________________________________
______________________________________________________________________________________
______________________________________________________________________________________
______________________________________________________________________________________
 
13.  What suggestions would you make to improve the current system? 
______________________________________________________________________________________
______________________________________________________________________________________
______________________________________________________________________________________
______________________________________________________________________________________
______________________________________________________________________________________
______________________________________________________________________________________
______________________________________________________________________________________
______________________________________________________________________________________
______________________________________________________________________________________
______________________________________________________________________________________
 
Thank you very much for completing this important survey.  Again, be assured your responses will be 
held in strict confidentiality and are for research purposes.  
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Appendix B. 
MAJCOM Level #11 #12 #13
AMC Sq
Intent of program is good but not sure how it is effectively used at higher 
levels in the AF to make decisions Yes, for the most part More relative comments
AMC Sq None
Yes if the people inputting the information 
are using accurate information Do away SORTS and use ART.
ACC Sq None
All areas reported within the report are 
beneficial in measuring units ready to fight 
posture.
In my opinion, it needs no changes, I 
actually like SORTS, ART is the hassle.
ACC Sq
With the age of computers we still submit a  handwritten report each month.  
I believe it would be much easier and accurate if subordinate units of a UTC 
package submitted their own data electronically each month.  We get data 
sheets approx. 12 different sources, it would be much easier to compile all 
the data together electronically.  Basically the rating is determined by the data 
anyway unless the commander assesses up.  Then when all the reporting is 
done the package responsible commder can then digitally sign it.
For the most part yes.  I believe it takes into 
consideration the areas that are needed for 
deploying.
Streamline by using technology more at the 
unit levels.
ACC Sq We do not deploy as a unit/squadron Yes, keeps you up to date None
ACC Sq
y y p y
reduncancies in SORTS and ART that tend to cuase some confusion.  I 
g q p
readiness status. None
ACC Sq None Yes None
AMC Sq None Yes
I believe SORTS works very well if you are 
being honest with your input.  I would like 
to see ART become more like SORTS 
instead of Green/Red
AMC Sq None Yes
A more comprehensive SORTS training 
program at MAJCOM level for all WING 
level personnel to attend.
AMC Sq Satisfied with current system Yes None
AMC Sq
I don’t see any problem with the Sorts system but in many areas I don’t 
believe it should be necessary.  We have very expensive globally capable 
computer systems to track almost all of the information in SORTS  and yet 
instead of people at various levels accessing those systems (CAMS, GO81) 
and checking our capability and readiness we generate yet another report.  
It’s like the old expression that “a man with 2 watches never really knows 
what time it is”  We generate so many reports and none of them exactly 
match so if we ever tried to compare them we would have no idea what our 
true status is.  
It’s effective, but redundant and I’m not 
convinced it’s always real accurate.  If the 
commander of the unit believes his or her 
unit can fulfill their war time tasking and the 
people in the unit believe it as well and they 
all have a sound understanding of the unit’s 
wartime tasking, a report full of facts and 
figures really doesn’t mean much.  The 
opposite is also true, if the commander and 
the people aren’t convinced that they can 
accomplish the unit’s war time tasking
Automate the system so it can pull the date 
from already existing data bases and 
anyone with a need to know at any level 
can pull up a SORTS report without the 
pain of individuals manually pulling the 
data from those data bases and running it 
through a gauntlet of coordination.  
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AMC Wg None
It's OK.  Our unit is somewhat unique in its 
mission, and don't believe that our DOC 
fully encompasses our mission ability.
Re-work DOC statement to tailor the 
specific unit location and their mission in 
that location.  Generalizing requirements 
are not realistic.
AMC Sq
It's not in plain text.  This requires significant research every month to 
complete and explain to commanders. n/a Put it in plain text.
AMC Sq
Get well dates are usually fabricated.  In many instances, there is no true 
solution date, but we have to put something.  This lends system of skewed 
information.
I don't have any problems with the system it 
it is employed at higher levels consistently.
No suggestions.  When we have to do 
ART and SORTS together, ART shows a 
horrible picture…more realistic, but 
horrible.  Not sure what SORTS even tells 
at that point.
AMC Wg
1. The only problem that I have experienced in the SORTS arena is the lack of 
training provided for SORTS Managers.  There is a class for the monitors but 
nothing for managers.  We’re required to know all of the information contained in 
AFI 10-201 but we’re not afforded any type of training or instruction.   
1.)I believe there should be additional 
SORTS classes  scheduled throughout the 
year for SORTS training.  I have been 
trying to schedule my alternate for training 
for 3 months now and all of the classes 
have been full.                2.)AMC should 
develop one comprehensive Self 
Inspection checklist.  The AMC IG 
checklist encompasses all aspects of 
inspecting the SORTS program but the 
AMC Self Inspection checklist does not.  
Many questions that should be asked are 
left off.
AMC Sq
1 – AFWWUS is the document of record for both steady state and contingency tasks 
at my MAJCOM, SORTS UTC’s and planned tasks are no longer relevant.  Why do 
we report on SORTS UTC’s when I haven’t been tasked against them in last two 
wars?
SORTS is good a measuring squadron readiness 
at a moment in time for generic training and 
equipment requirements.  No gauge is made of 
experience or specific mission requirements – 
ready for MTW in Korea, but might have a hard 
time supporting a different task.
Combine it with ART for the whole picture of 
UTC’s being tasked to fill war and steady state 
requirements.   
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AMC Sq
1.) Current and accurate DOC statement for Unit Designation                                     
2.) DOC statement designation of UTC accuracy    3.)  Need for Self-Inspection for 
units not a smaller version of Wing Self-Inspection
Yes if DOC statements are reviewed 
annually as required and Unit feedback is 
used.
Make is easier to coordinate changes to 
the Unit DOC statement.
AMC Sq None
The current system is effective in 
measuring the OG and the squadron 
effectiveness in measuring the unit's 
readiness.
I think the current system is working just 
fine.
AMC Sq
A little complicated for beginners.  However, I think it is an efficient tool in 
measuring a unit's readiness.
Yes, as long as the user understands how 
to input data and the CC is capable of 
subjective reasoning. None
AMC Wg
1.) Outdated Doc Statements.                                                   2.) Confusion between 
SORTS and ART Reporting.                                                                            3.) 
CBDRT and Mobility Bags.  (Who reports, who does not, and what are the correct 
authorizations for the bags). 
Yes to a point.  However SORTS would be 
more effective if the Doc Statements were 
continuously updated.  This way the SORTS 
report would match the unit current mission. 
1.) Update the Doc Statements in a timely 
manner. ( I have one Doc Statement with an 
effective date 1996).                                            
2.) Provide better training in the mobile 
training course to cover CBDRT Reporting 
better. I have attended a couple of the mobile 
teams training courses and CBDRT and 
Mobility Bags are briefly covered. Covering 
how to determine the authorizations and who 
reports would be helpful.                   3.) If used 
properly SORTS Reporting is a very effective 
tool. 
ACC Sq
1.)  Current Guidance dictates we cannot use SIPERNET to transmit the reports to 
the Command Post (CP).  This system is in place for this type of information and 
SORTS is not tapping into it at the Unit level.                                                             
2.) I have been told several times NOT to compare SORTS with ARTS.  ARTS is a 
total “worst case” scenerio snapshot; whereas, SORTS seems to only care about a 
smaller number as defined by the Unit DOC Statement.
No, as explained in 11. (2) above, it revolves 
around the Unit DOC Statement.
Incorporate the ability to report SORTS via 
SIPERNET/Website, just like ART 
reporting.  
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ACC Sq
1.) The system is difficult to understand at times so you have to be an expert to 
correctly complete the report.                                                                                         
2.)  I’m sure the information is used above base level, but SORTS utility at the base 
is limited.  We focus mostly on ART reporting.
I am not convinced it is a good tool.  There are 
other factors, to include extensive training 
issues, that affect my unit’s ability to go to war 
that are not measured in SORTS.  That said, I 
am not sure expanding SORTS reporting to 
include such factors would be worth the effort.  I 
know it would inundate higher levels.  What 
CCs need to do is make an overall rating taking 
into account SORTS type information and other 
information to determine their unit’s go to war 
capability.  Honestly, however, I am not sure 
how this can be objectively accomplished.  
Subjective reasoning and evaluation must be a 
part of such a decision., unfortunately, such 
evaluations are not supportable and never 
looked favorably upon. 
See # 12 above.  Quite frankly, I prefer the 
ART format because it forces me to align 
persons against UTC posturings.  Reporting 
raw numbers as we do in SORTS does not 
allow for the same effect as we get from ART 
reporting.    If we could build on ART and 
factor into it some type of  training measures, 
we might have a better system.  Additionally, 
we separate SORTS and ART in the reporting 
making certain assumptions in one that are 
probably not valid in the whole.  Does not 
seem to make sense to me. 
ACC Sq
1. THE FORMS ARE TOO COMPLICATED WITH TOO MANY 
ABBREVIATIONS AND ACRONYMS.                                                                     
2.  THE ART REPORT IS ALL THAT IS NEEDED TO REPORT READINESS.  
YES, IT IS FOR AEF DEPLOYMENTS AND NOT FOR MAJOR THEATER 
WAR BUT WITH THE CURRENT OIF, WHEN THE CALL CAME TO GO WE 
WENT.  I DIDN’T SEE THAT WHAT WAS REPORTED ON SORTS MADE A 
DIFFENENCE BETWEEN BEING ASKED OR NOT.  AS THE WAR WAS 
GENNING UP IN DEC-FEB, ALL UNITS HAD TO SUBMIT, BY A 
SEPARATE TASKER EACH MONTH, AN ANSWER IF WE COULD 
SUPPORT X UTC.                                              3. SORTS REPORTING DOES 
NOT WORK WELL WHEN MEMBERS OF  AN AFSC ARE SPREAD OUT 
ALL OVER A BASE LIKE PERSONNEL AND ADMIN TROOPS.   THE UNIT 
DOCUMENTS USED FOR NUMBERS DON’T INCLUDE THE 
PERSONNELISTS ASSIGNED TO OTHER UNITS
NO BECAUSE IT DOES NOT INCLUDE 
PERSONNELIST ASSIGNED TO OTHER 
UNITS THAT CAN BE USED FOR OUR 
DOC STATEMENT
DELETE IT AND USE ART.__THERE IS 
NO DIFFERENCE BETWEEN MAJOR 
THEATER WAR AND AEF STEADY 
STATE DEPLOYMENTS.  EACH BASE IS 
TASKED BY UTC ANYWAY AND THE 
ART REPORT TELLS THE HEALTH  OF 
EACH UTC.  DELETE SORTS FOR 
SUPPORT UNITS  
 
 60
ACC Sq
Operations squadrons with DOC statements rely on supporting squadrons to provide 
them information on resources (people, acft, spare engines, etc.) as an integral part 
of the SORTS assessment and reporting process.  There is lack of definition 
especially at wings with multiple ops squadrons regarding how to report (e.g., 
choosing one “Alpha” squadron” and reporting them as green at the expense of the 
other unit(s)).  Also, ops squadrons are reluctant to solicit inputs from supporting 
squadrons (e.g., AMXS, EMS, CMS, etc.) for one reason or another, and there is no 
mandatory process at the Wing level to review SORTS.  It’s up to the supporting 
squadrons to ask to see a copy of the supported squadron’s SORTS report to make 
sure they are accurately reporting on “their” resources.  A more defined process at 
wing level is needed in the AFI covering SORTS to prevent haphazard reporting 
(“just use last month’s data…it never changes”) and make sure everyone with a 
stake in the report has a chance to review it before it goes up to the 
MAJCOM...Also, the AEF Center ART reporting tool duplicates info that should be 
ACC Sq Ops Units are still reporting Maintenance n/a n/a
ACC Sq
Provider.  The problem is the system really doesn’t tell you anything.   My aircraft 
stats are from the maintenance unit.  I have yet to understand how they can send the 
number sup that they do.  My number are the best I can come up with.  That doesn’t 
tell you they are trained etc. No, see above
I’m not sure I have a solution.  I think 
percentage trained (first time cdc pass, 
checkrides ect) are more important.  
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ACC Wg
1.  AFSORTSDET  is not a user friendly program.  I encounter many problems with 
AFSORTSDET that even my MAJCOM reps do not have a solution to.                      
2. If our units are tasked to deploy and they are not fully capable they will take 
assets from other squadrons for fill up the squadron being tasked.  The way SORTS 
is measured it does not give room to reflect situations like these.                                  
3. The unit SORTS monitors are not receiving adequate training at the SORTS 
MTT Classes from AETC.
NO, If our flying units or combat comm. units 
are tasked to deploy and they are not fully 
capable they will take assets from other 
squadrons to full up the squadron being tasked.  
The way SORTS is measured it does not give 
room to reflect situations like these..  The unit 
commanders are constantly complaining to me 
that we should report as a wing or a group
I believe a system should be developed to 
replace AFSORTSDET that will allow the 
information to be updated as soon as it is input 
into the system.  The program should not have 
error messages that take 24 hours to receive.  
The error messages should pop up immediately 
after the incorrect information has been input.
AMC Sq
1.  The SORTS monitor class really needs to be more in depth.  The class I went to 
was only for 3 days and two of those days we got out really early.  The class did not 
explain to us in detail how we should build reports.  The attempt was there, but the 
instructor went fast and did not cover the entire information needed for processing 
SORTS.  I say this because the people that come back from the class are still 
concerned as was myself.                                                                                      2. I 
am pretty good with remarks on paper, but more inclusive guidance from AMC 
would help.  For example: Personnel-if you have people on leave or TDY, exactly 
what information would you like in there.  I.e. AFSC/What the AFSC is and 
Schedule return dates.  We have guidance already, but I feel there should be no 
room for error.  What a better way than if it is in writing.   This would also help me 
when I train new SORTS Monitors.   I have the current guidance, but I feel that the 
more information that we have in the system the better.  As it is right now, The 
Monitors can put what they like and I cannot really say much to them except that I w The current system works fine. none  
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ACC Wg
1.) I have a huge problem with the MEQLOCN because it never accurately updates 
my aircraft.  Sometimes I have triple the aircraft that I have actually reported.  2.) 
Sometimes my reports come up overdue when I know I updated them way before 
they were due  3.) I have to enter a userid and password everytime I want to get into 
FTP  4.) It takes too long for easy reads to update.  5.) I hate having to do the hard 
return after inputing all the information 
yes and no-sometimes I am not able to 
accurately report a unit’s percentage because the 
system likes it to stay at 100% as long as they 
are still in that category.
I’m not creative enough to do any of that, but 
perhaps something that will automatically tell 
you when you’ve made an error
ACC Sq
1)   Despite having a C-4 rating we have deployed twice, for OEF and for OIF, and 
have done superbly, but only after great emphasis was placed on getting us new 
equipment at the MAJCOM level 2) My squadron has 14 deployable UTCs and 
SORTS treats them all equally, as 1 of 14 for my S-rating.  The problem, some of 
these UTCs are so critical that if we don’t have it we don’t get to do our mission.  
The S-rating needs significant work to adequately “rate” our UTC status against 
DOC mission 3)SORTS is supposedly the system I use to report status up the chain 
and it should be the basis for additional training and resources being provided to the 
squadron as needed.  I have yet to be given any training or resources that was 
directly linked to any SORTS reporting information. 4)  The reality of the Air Force 
manning situation means I qualify many individuals on multiple UTCs and when 
the time comes to deploy I must work with the MAJCOM to determine the priority 
of the UTCs they may want this deployment, since I can’t man them all.  This fact 
does not readily stand out in the current SORTS reporting system.
No, I do not feel that it is.  There are times when 
I have been C-4 and feel I am more mission 
capable than if I were C-2, or when compared to 
other squadrons who’s SORTS rating may be 
higher
Prove to commanders that SORTS is used by 
leadership and show them how resources are 
distributed based on SORTS ratings.  The 
perception is it’s an outdated tool that we must 
fill out because that’s the way we do it in the 
military.  If it has outlived it’s usefulness, 
replace it.  ACC uses ART now, is that a 
coincidence? 
AMC Gp
1.) The process being used for SORTS reporting does not provide detailed 
information at point of data entry.  You must read though multiple line entries to 
identify specifically what UTC is having what problems.  Very Fragmented.  Using 
ART format for reporting, provides specific and detailed information in a snapshot 
perspective.  Adding a cover page that allows a commander to rate readiness 
capability (SORTS LEVEL) would give you the best of both worlds without all the 
fragmented data for UTC’s being scattered across multiple pages.  Red is not ready 
to deploy and Green is ready to deploy….  There is no gray area.                                 
2.) With next rotation of Designed Operational Capability (DOC) statements having 
all UTC’s from the AFWUS included except for DXX and AXX, if a process is not 
created to merge SORTS and ART into a single report we will be completing two 
separate formats for the same data, greatly enhancing the possibility for erroneous 
and conflicting data to be presented.  i.e. when SORTS is processed a UTC may be 
non-deployable but when ART is completed a week later the UTC is reported Green. No see above in 11
As mentioned above.  A single reporting tool 
that provides snapshot of specific UTC and the 
capability of it being able to meet it’s 
deployable mission.  As much effort as possible 
should be made to extract portions of data from 
existing electronic means.  i.e. pulling medical 
equipment status from DMLSS, versus using 
30 day old data on what percentage we were 
at.  
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ACC Sq I hate having to do the hard return after inputing all the information 
No.  We consider too many people available 
when they are not.  Can't get them back to 
redeploy. n/a
AMC Sq I just started doing SORTS so I don't have any problems with it as of now n/a n/a
AMC Sq I really don't get that involved with the report itself I assume so. None
ACC Sq I have not worked with SORTS enough to give any constructive feedback. blank blank
AMC Sq blank blank blank
AMC Sq blank blank blank
AMC Sq blank blank blank
ACC Sq blank blank blank
AMC Sq blank blank blank
AMC Sq Nothing Nothing Nothing
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